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Abstract:
SCADA and ICS security have been focusing on addressing issues such
as vulnerability discovery and intrusion detection within critical national
infrastructure. Less attention has been paid to architectural solutions to the cyber
security risks from an information assurance perspective. Security controls are
not always traced back to the business requirements. This paper presents a holistic
end-to-end view of the requirements, medium to high severity risks and proposes
a generic security architectural pattern to address them. The architectural pattern
is developed based on the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture
(SABSA) top two layers, contextual and conceptual, which are responsible
for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept
architecture and strategy. Moreover, this research is motivated by industrial
practices and has reflected the recent changes of GCHQ’s mission. This research
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also contributes to the SCADA/ICS risk assessment by deriving holistic sets of
risk management and architectural design requirements for SCADA/ICS.
Keywords: Industry Control Systems; Critical National Infrastructure; Security
Architectural Pattern; Risk Management; Business Requirements; SABSA.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
have been at the forefront of the news in recent years, in particular, the event at Iranian
nuclear enrichment facility in 2010 [1], the Stuxnet malware caused enrichment centrifuges.
It provided false healthy status to the control centre computers. According to a 2013 survey
[2] of nearly 700 participants conducted by the SANS institute, attack vectors of most
concern against SCADA and ICS services include internal threat actors, advanced zero-
day malware (i.e. Stuxnet or Flame) and external threats from hacktivists, terrorists or
governments. Nearly 70% of responses indicated the threat to be high or severe in nature.
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The top three primary drivers in relation to security with SCADA and ICS systems listed are
control system service interruption prevention, damage prevention and information leakage
prevention. The participants roles include average business user, auditor, IT director and
manager, network administrator, security analyst, security manager, and others, among
which security analyst accounts for 51%.
In recent years, there has been many studies conducted and papers written covering
various aspects of SCADA and ICS security [3, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Studies
relating to security risk management include the application of the attack tree [25, 26]
and diagrammatic risk modeling approach [27]. Extant work also provides control system
security standards, guidelines and best practices providing guidance on security risk
management. These include IEC/ISA-62443 [4], the internationally recognised industrial
control system security standard, NIST SP 800-82 [5], a cross-industry guidance for
establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS), the UK’s CPNI [6], a good practice
guide for ICS security and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s [7] guidance on
the enhancement of ICS security. NIST SP 800-82 does an excellent job of providing
best practice guidance for each of the various aspects of securing ICS/SCADA networks,
however, it does not take a holistic business view and allow business requirements to be
used to drive the controls. Moreover, there is a lot of information to get through before
the reader can start to pull together a viable conceptual solution. There is a need of a
generic architectural pattern that develops a target architecture based on a set of documented
requirements, threats and risks, which can be adapted to suit. The UK’s CPNI is a useful
document but does not develop an architecture from the business requirements down.
Businesses are in need of seeing that architectures are in support of the business requirements
and by showing transparently they are through the use of attribute profiling that makes it
transparent to auditing and review.
1.2 Motivation
Fernandez et al. [9] proposed methods to build a secure SCADA system using security
patterns. They studied SCADA system from a high level looking at components such as
vulnerabilities with physical access to the SCADA system and countering it by applying a
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) process. This work was more aligned with conceptual
architectural design than as a pattern for secure implementation of SCADA/ICS systems,
which would benefit security practitioners and system architects. Gobena et al. [10] devised
a new wide area network communications mechanism for connecting SCADA and ICS
services to ensure availability. However, the focus was not on the confidentiality or integrity
of system messaging in any more detail. Wu et al. [11] focused on the implementation
of controls to capture, analyse and report breaches of security with regards to SCADA
and ICS based systems and services for the forensic investigation and ultimate recovery
and prosecution of the threat actors where possible. The paper explains the different types
of attack and proposes a detailed forensics process. Zhendong et al. [12] provided the
most detailed approach towards an architectural implementation, however, as with previous
research, this was not of a sufficient level to provide a practitioner with the necessary level
of decomposition such that they could design and implement secure industrial systems and
services. In sum, despite these works being focused on architectural reference and design,
the majority were at too high a level for the security practitioner to use to implement a
secure SCADA and ICS service without significant further decomposition.
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This research is also motivated by industrial practices. Due to changes within
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)’s mission directive, whereby the
scope of CLAS will be expanded to support the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) with
Information Assurance related matters, as well as the lack of advice for architects with
regards to securing SCADA and ICS based systems, this research has been undertaken to
provide a security architectural pattern to bridge the gap between CNI and IA, hence address
SCADA/ICS systems risks.
1.3 The proposed security architectural pattern
However to date, very little documentation has been developed that provides an information
assurance (IA) practitioners a holistic explanation of what the actual risks are and how to
mitigate them. This paper presents a number of medium to high severity risks and proposes
a security architectural pattern to address them. The architectural pattern is designed based
on the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA), which has been widely
used to design business security frameworks [17, 18, 19, 20]. SABSA is selected because
it is a robust and internationally recognised architecture methodology which focuses on the
business requirements and develops from there. It has been used over other methodologies
because of its business focus and ability to trace controls back to these requirements [8].
It helps removing the risk of developing technical architectures in isolation of what the
business needs. In this paper, the architectural pattern is delivered based on the SABSA’s
top two layers, namely contextual and conceptual, which are responsible for understanding
the business requirements and development of a concept architecture and strategy [8]. The
concept architecture can then be taken forward by the IA practitioners and adjusted to satisfy
the needs of their own organisations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the current
architectural patterns for implementation of secure SCADA and ICS services. Section 3
presents a number of medium to high severity risks, whilst Section 4 presents the proposed
security architectural pattern and Section 5 discusses the proposed security architectural
pattern. Section 6 summarises the paper and lays the foundations for future work.
2 ICS Infrastructure
Traditional SCADA/ICS systems were composed of isolated networks without connection to
others (e.g. corporate networks and the Internet) [13]. Most did not have the security risks we
know today and subsequently were flat networks with very little control implemented. Based
on CPNI documentation [14], Figure 1 summarises a typical SCADA and ICS network
implementation today, which has evolved to become integrated with the corporate network
as well as there having been the introduction of remote access and support capabilities with
remote sites and third parties.
3 Risk Management
3.1 Threat Assessment
The Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is subject to a number of threat sources, which
are detailed below along with their representative scores regarding the threat level of them




















Figure 1 Typical SCADA and ICS deployment today
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attacking a CNI provider. Table 1 provides a typical overview of threats, not exhaustive. This
is based on Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG) Information Assurance
Standard 1/2 [34] which is used for risk management within the UK public sector, including
CNI providers. Other sources of threats exist in documents such as ISO27001, CRAMM
(Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency Risk Analysis and Management
Method) and Pilar. A more focused assessment should be undertaken against the readers’
organisation to understand the difference of their own threat profile and accommodate


















Table 1 Threat assessment
Ref. Threat Source Capability Rationale Motivation Rationale
TS1 Disaffected or dishonest
employees
High Knowledge of internal systems and
processes
High This type of threat source will have a
high probability of wanting to cause
some form of damage to an organisation
TS2 Foreign Intelligence
Services (FIS)
High Highly skilled and funded Low CNI does not normally contain sensitive
information which would be of interest
to FIS
TS3 State Sponsored High Highly skilled and funded High This has been seen previously (e.g.
Stuxnet)
TS4 Amateur hackers Low Low skilled/experience Medium- High The most common attack vector is
incorrectly configured Internet facing
systems. Amateur hackers tend to run
vulnerability scans across the Internet
and toolsets are available for those with
limited knowledge/skill
TS5 Malware writers High High skilled programmers Low Most malware does not focus on
SCADA/ICS platforms
TS6 Terrorists Medium Terrorists have become skilled over
the last few years in cyber warfare
High The CNI is a low cost viable attack
vector for terrorists wanting to cause
disruption to the UK
TS7 Investigative journalists Low Low skill, usually engaging in an
external resource for cyber-attacks
Low No useful information is held on




Medium Skills and knowledge of the systems
and processes
Low- Medium Competitive pricing and costs within the
industry can drive industrial espionage
from competitors
TS9 Political pressure groups/
activists
Low Low skill and defacement of
websites
Low More focused on website attacks. Less
focused on political causes
TS10 Organised criminal groups Low- Medium Low-medium skill set for
ICS/SCADA attack
Low More focused on credit card style fraud,
laundering etc.
TS11 Academia and research High Highly skilled. Developing cutting
edge research.
Medium Indirectly, academia and research
groups communicate vulnerabilities,
exploits etc. through publications and
seminars
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It is clear from the threat assessment that there are a number of highly capable threat
sources, which could have a vested interested in causing significant impact to the UK’s
national infrastructure. The type and level of security controls that need to be put in place
to minimise risk from them needs to provide a significant defence in depth capability.
3.2 Risk Assessment and Treatment
Table 2 provides a high level risk assessment and treatment plan of a typical SCADA and
ICS implementation based on SCADA and ICS deployment in section 2. Threat sources
have only been shown where their risk has been assessed as medium or higher. The
treatment (control) are to be applied to the previously identified risks to reduce them to
an acceptable level. This is based on a qualitative approach, following the international


















Table 2: Risk assessment and treatment plan
Ref Risk Threat
Source(s)
Impact Severity Treatment (Control) Residual Risk
R1 Unauthorised access to





High High Perimeter Security (Firewall),












High High Tiered architecture
methodology Firewall control at
the security domain edge Virtual
LAN (VLAN) separation of
traffic types / services
None






High High Protective monitoring service
auditing policy
None









R5 Lack of security awareness





Medium Medium Security training and staff
awareness programme induction
policy, Security policy (wrt
training and awareness)
None












Impact Severity Treatment (Control) Residual Risk










R8 Plain text data and
commands being sent from




Medium Medium Virtual LAN (VLAN)
segregation, Switch hardening
to monitor and protect against
CAM table flooding and VLAN
hopping
Data will remain
unencrypted if a secure
communications protocol
is unavailable













Medium Medium Sign up to industry WARP
service or vulnerability advisory
service4
None
R11 Compromise of corporate






High High Network segmentation -
firewalls, Network intrusion
detection or prevention system
(NIDS/NIPS)
None
R12 The SCADA/ICS network
external communications
infrastructure introduces
































Impact Severity Treatment (Control) Residual Risk
R13 Remote support and third





High High Tiered Architecture, Network
intrusion detection or prevention
system (NIDS/NIPS), Protective
Monitoring, RBAC, 3rd party




4 The Framework - Architectural Pattern
As mentioned above, the architectural pattern is delivered based on the SABSA security
architecture framework’s top two layers, namely, contextual and conceptual, which are
responsible for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept
architecture and strategy. The concept architecture can then be taken forward by the IA
practitioner and made more relevant to his or her organisation and constraints. The pattern
is delivered by starting with business requirements engineering, defining architectural
principles for the design and finally developing the conceptual design itself with detailed
information on the technical, governance and assurance controls implemented. The pattern
also provides advice and guidance at managing legacy installations.
4.1 The Focus of Contextual & Conceptual Layers in SABSA
The contextual layer of the SABSA framework is concerned with identification of the
business requirements (BR) and the development of security focused business drivers (BD),
which will support the business requirements and drive the security architecture. Business
Requirements (BRs) are obtained from the stakeholders and will be in the language of
business. They will not specifically be security focused and nor will they be in the language
a security professional may be familiar with. Business Drivers (BDs) are defined in the
language of security to deliver, support and enable one or more of the BRs. A typical example
of this could be that the Chief Operating Officer (COO) is “concerned that the ICS network
must be up and running 100% of the time, any down time will have a financial impact on
the organisation”. This is a business requirement (from the COO). A BD to support/enable
this would be “The availability of the ICS network must be maintained at 100% service”.
The conceptual layer of this framework is concerned with normalisation of the business
drivers (BD) into attributes1 and development of the conceptual design. Figure 2 illustrates
this process in diagrammatic form.
Figure 2 Architectural process
This pattern is designed to provide an overall holistic approach to delivering a secure
architecture for SCADA and ICS based infrastructure. It is conceptual in nature, which
means it is not intended to be a definitive architectural design for immediate implementation,
but more a guidance design with services architected in line with best practice, up to date
risk assessment as well as some degree of future proofing based on current and future trends
ascertained from previous research.
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4.2 Business Requirements
The business requirements will change depending on sector, regulatory demands, business
and financial constraints etc. Table 3 details typical business requirements for a CNI provider
as a generic starting point. SCADA and ICS systems work 24/7/365. Downtime refers to the
business stopping, which can result in a financial impact as well as fines in some regulated
industries, if the period of this time is above agreed limits. Therefore the main business
focus is the availability of the SCADA and ICS systems.
Table 3 Business requirements
Ref. Requirement
BR1 The service must maintain maximum up time and prevent control system disruption.
BR2 The service must be supportable remotely.
BR3 The SCADA system must be accessible by the corporate network for data exchange.
BR4 The service must be accessed by authorised staff only.
BR5 The service must be allowed to utilise connectivity across public networks, such as the
Internet.
BR6 The service must have internal auditing and monitoring to identify system misuse or
attack.
BR7 The service must deter threat sources identified as having a high likelihood of attack.
BR8 The service must deter internal threat actors (threat source TS1).
BR9 Prevent damage to the industrial systems and the ICS controls.
BR10 Prevent information leakage.
4.3 Business Drivers
Business requirements (BR) are high level requirements defined by the business stakeholders
and as such can be complex, such as “deliver a secure ICT network”. So to be more specific,
manageable, traceable and security focused business drivers (BD) are developed to support
one or more BRs, thereby allowing complex requirements to be broken down and hence,
managed more easily. Table 4 details the business drivers (BD) and what BRs they support.
4.4 Attribute Profiling
An attribute is defined [16] as a conceptual abstraction of a real business requirement
(the goals, objectives, drivers and targets), which is modelled into a normalised language
that articulates requirements and measures performance in a way that is instinctive to all
stakeholders. Table 5 provides an attribute profile based on the BDs along with the standard
definition from SABSA [16].
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Table 4 Business drivers
Reference Business Driver Supporting BR
BD1 Provide accessibility of SCADA and ICS based systems
remotely to authorised support staff.
BR2, BR4
BD2 Implement protective monitoring to audit key systems
to capture information relating to system use/misuse,
including at a minimum, action, username, source IP
address, date and time.
BR6, BR7, BR8, BR9
BD3 Provide a mechanism for connecting the SCADA
and ICS infrastructure to the corporate network for
authorised support access.
BR3, BR4
BD4 Provide connectivity over cost effective public network
channels, i.e. the Internet.
BR5
BD5 Provide connectivity from the corporate network for data
exchange.
BR3
BD6 Identify and deter attacks from highly competent threat
sources.
BR7, BR9, BR10
BD7 Implement architectural layering to provide containment
controls and defence in depth to key assets.
BR7, BR9, BR10
BD8 Maintain availability of service to n%. BR1


















Table 5: Attribute profile
Requirement Attribute Definition
BD1 Authenticated Every party claiming a unique identity (i.e. a claimant) should be subject to a procedure that verifies that
the party is indeed the authentic owner of the claimed identity.
Authorized The system should allow only those actions that have been explicitly authorised.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access. Unauthorised access should be prevented
BD2 Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute
specifications are being met. Any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems
management function.
Auditable The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and
outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit
records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs.
BD3 Interoperable The system should interoperate with other similar systems, both immediately and in future as intersystem
communication becomes increasingly a requirement.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute
specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems
management function.
BD4 Cost Effective The design, acquisition, implementation, and operation of the system should be achieved at a cost that
the business finds acceptable when judged against the benefits.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute
specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems
management function.
BD5 Interoperable The system should interoperate with other similar systems, both immediately and in future as intersystem
communication becomes increasingly a requirement.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
BD6 Detectable Important events must be detected and reported.
16Table 5: (continued)
Requirement Attribute Definition
Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute
specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems
management function.
Auditable The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and
outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit
records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
BD7 Architecturally Open The system architecture should, wherever possible, not be locked into specific vendor interface standards
and should allow flexibility in the choice of vendors and products, both initially and in the future.
BD8 Available The information and services provided by the system should be available according to the requirements
specified in the service- level agreement (SLA).
BD9 Detectable Important events must be detected and reported.
Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute
specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems
management function.
Auditable The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and
outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit
records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs.
Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the
authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
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4.5 Design
The design phase is split between architectural principles, which define the underlying
general rules and guidelines for the design, and the design itself.
4.5.1 Architectural principles
There are two key architectural principles to ensure the service is delivered against the
business requirements, which are tiered architecture and the defence-in-depth model.
A tiered architecture allows for types of services (i.e. web/application services which
present front end applications to users) to be collectively located within logical or physical
domains where a security policy can be applied. A three-tiered architecture is typical of
an infrastructure whereby end users and third parties will access the network through an
access layer. This will be responsible for securing the user connectivity to the network
either directly, i.e. switch port security, or indirectly, i.e. over remote access or virtual
private networks (VPN). The presentation layer is responsible for locating the application
services, user authentication to the applications, applying role based access control (RBAC),
providing authorised views of data as well as auditing user activity within the application(s).
The data layer is located in the heart of the network and connectivity is restricted to the
authorised applications that need to access the database or data repository. Communication
in this layer is usually restricted to application traffic using database commands, such as
SQL.
Each layer is segregated from the others via firewalls, which are configured to allow
only approved protocols and services through as strictly as possible. Figure 3 below shows
a diagrammatic representation of a three-tiered architecture model.
Figure 3 Tiered architecture model
The second is to deliver defence in depth [16] by layering security controls so as to
reduce the risk to the assets being protected. As can be seen in Figure 4, by applying multiple
controls “on top of” the information asset (in this case the SCADA and ICS configuration
and management data) the architect introduces further barriers, which a threat actor has to
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overcome. For the more competent threat actors this will slow them down within the time
it takes to get through some of the controls, the protective monitoring service should have
alerted someone to the attack, which will allow further action to be taken (such as dropping
the threat actors connection).
Figure 4 Defence in depth model
Defence in depth ensures there is no single point of failure from threats to assets by
providing differing barriers (controls) in a layered approach. By applying the industry
standard 80/20 rule (80% effectiveness of a control) to each control, you decrease the
likelihood of a compromise exponentially as another control is layered on, as can be seen
in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5 Defence in depth 80/20 rule
4.5.2 Conceptual design
In line with the business drivers, risk assessment and architectural principles above, Figure
6 describes the conceptual target architecture for delivering SCADA and ICS based services
in a risk managed way. SABSA attributes have been added where relevant to the services
to ensure appropriate controls are included during any revision of the design by the reader.






















































Figure 6 Target architecture
4.6 Components of the Architectural Pattern
This section provides more details about the control components within the target
architecture. By applying the layering architectural principle, the three core components of
the overall solution are split up into their own security domains and placed neatly in their
representative layers, as follows.
4.6.1 Access layer
Access layer provides the first line of defence with connectivity to and from the “corporate
network” as well as remote systems and support along with third party support,
• Data exchange between the corporate network and the SCADA/ICS network systems
should be inspected for data schema validation and content inspection to ensure
malicious packets are not injected into the SCADA/ICS network from the corporate
network.
• Third party support should be configured to allow only the minimum system
connectivity and access required as defined in a corporate third party security policy.
• Intrusion detection/prevention services monitor network communications from lower
trust networks, such as the corporate network and remote/third party access networks.
• Remote access is managed through a dedicated RAS/VPN service, which, depending
on make/model, can be configured to provide network access control (NAC) capability
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to ensure remote endpoints meet a minimum level of technical security (i.e. security
patches are up to date, AV signature definition is within acceptable delta etc.).
4.6.2 Presentation layer
Presentation layer delivers the application functionality and formats the information for
further processing or display,
• RBAC configured within the applications to ensure users meet the principle of “least
privilege” for their role(s).
• Segregation of security domains is achieved through layer 3 stateful firewalls.
• Application servers should have a host based IPS software agent installed to minimise
risk to the host and application through attacks such as buffer overflows or malicious
commands (i.e. SQL injection).
4.6.3 Data layer
Data Layer provides security for the backend databases and repositories,
• Segregation of security domains is achieved through layer 3 stateful firewalls.
• Consideration should be given to encrypting sensitive databases.
• Data read/write should only be possible from authorised accounts associated with the
SCADA and ICS application(s).
Table 6 provides a list of the component security controls from the target architecture
to form the basis of a bill of materials (BoM).
4.7 Traceability
A good architecture will start with the business requirements (BR), derive security focused
business drivers (BDs) to support these and develop the necessary design to support
the BDs. According to Palmer [28], “traceability provides support in understanding the
relationships that across architectural requirements, design and implementation”. Table 7
shows traceability mapping among business drivers, attributes and controls.
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Table 6 Component list
Component Purpose Location
Network IDS/IPS Analyse network packets for malicious content/activity. Access layer
Firewalls Segregated security domains and provide containment.
Restrict traffic to approved protocols and
source/destination addresses.
All layers
Web Application Firewalls (WAF) provide layer 7
inspection of application traffic and can prevent
malicious communications such as SQL injection.
Presentation layer
SIEM Provide analysis of logged events from monitored
endpoints to identify breaches (or suspected breach) in
security policy.
All layers
RAS / VPN Provide controlled remote access to the environment,
enforcing security policy on remote users in the form of
NAC as well as auditing and RBAC.
Access layer
Content Gateway Provide schema and data validation checks on exported
(and imported) data to (and from) the corporate network.
Access layer
For sensitive data, it would be advised also to implement
data loss prevention (DLP) technology on the gateway
to restrict exfiltration of data which should not leave the
environment.
Host IPS Analyse OS and application processes to prevent attacks
such as buffer overflows or malicious code injection.
Presentation layer
System Hardening Best practice guidance to secure devices, OS and
applications to reduce security footprint.
All layers
RBAC Provide role based access control to staff to enforce




Installed on all systems where files can be exchanged
and/or media (CD/DVD/USB keys etc.) can be installed.
All layers
22Table 7 Architecture traceability to BDs
Business Driver Attribute(s) Control(s)
BD1 Authenticated, Authorised, Access-Controlled Firewall, RAS / VPN
BD2 Monitored, Auditable Protective Monitoring / SIEM, System Hardening
BD3 Interoperable, Access Controlled, Monitored Firewall, Network IDS/IPS, Protective Monitoring / SIEM
BD4 Cost Effective, Access Controlled, Monitored RAS / VPN, Network IDS/IPS
BD5 Interoperable, Access Controlled Content Gateway, Firewalls
BD6 Detectable, Monitored, Auditable, Access-Controlled Network IDS/IPS, Host IPS, System Hardening, Protective Monitoring / SIEM,
Firewalls, RBAC
BD7 Architecturally Open Firewalls
BD8 Available All controls working to form defence in depth
BD9 Detectable, Monitored, Auditable, Access-Controlled Network IDS/IPS, Host IPS, System Hardening, Protective Monitoring / SIEM,
Firewalls. RBAC
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5 Discussion
This pattern has achieved what it set out to do in a structured manner in that it has, firstly,
identified current risks with SCADA and ICS systems, it then derived a typical set of
business requirements for using industrial control technology, through a globally recognised
security architecture framework, SABSA. For this research, a conceptual target architecture
was developed, which can provide the basis for organisations to build their own target
architecture. As the pattern is based on the principle of a tiered architecture, extensibility
is made easier by introducing components into the correct tier and managing connectivity
between tiers through the corresponding security controls.
The architectural pattern can be used to develop a future state architecture to drive the
legacy platform towards through business change. Rather than the SCADA and ICS systems
themselves, this pattern focuses on architecture of the infrastructure they operate within.
SCADA and ICS systems connected directly by public connectivity are still common today
and they allow for low capability threat actors to gain access. Simple “best practice” will
reduce the overall risk and remove the low to medium capability threat actors from the
equation. With the premise that no security is 100%, preventing the high capability threat
actors is not possible. By following the defence in depth principle, the IA practitioner can
slow their activities down through the barriers (controls) and with a good level of system
auditing and anomaly detection within the protective monitoring service, the security team
can be alerted in real time to any suspect or actual incident, thereby being able to take any
action deemed necessary in a timely manner.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
SCADA and ICS security have attracted people’s attention and there have been plenty of
studies covering many aspects of these systems. Although a lot of information exists in
various forms and formats on designing secure industrial control systems and networks,
very little documentation has been developed to document a holistic view of SCADA/ICS
system risks and to guide IA practitioners on how to mitigate these risks. This paper brings
all that information together and providing a generic architectural pattern and holistic end
to end view of the requirements, risks assessments and mitigations.
We have identified current risks with SCADA and ICS systems and proposes a security
architectural pattern to address them. The newly developed architectural pattern is based
on two layers of the SABSA framework, contextual and conceptual, which are responsible
for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept architecture
and strategy. The use of the SABSA framework allows the organisations to focus on their
business and trace controls back to these requirements, removing the risk of developing
technical architectures in isolation of the business needs. The deliverables include holistic
sets of ICS/SCADA threat sources, risk assessment and treatment controls, typical sets of
business requirements, business drivers, attributes and architectural design.
Extant research has provided rich security risk management and control methods.
However, it has not clearly distinguished those that are suitable for SCADA/ICS. This
research has addressed this issue by deriving holistic sets of risk management and
architectural design requirements for SCADA/ICS. In addition, this research is motivated
by industrial needs. The integration of industrial practices allows the framework to be more
practical and suitable to guide IA practitioners in real practice.
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A initial testing of the pattern has been shown through the risk assessment and risk
treatment plan with the identified risk mitigation controls in the conceptual design. Future
work should conduct more explicit testing such as the pattern implementation as part of
an architectural engagement with a CNI service provider or in a virtualised environment
subjecting to penetration testing.
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